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Nomos and Narrative Before Nomos and
Narrative
Steven D. Fraade*
I imagine that when Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative essay' first
reached the editors of the Harvard Law Review, their befuddlement
derived not so much from Cover's framing of his review of the 1982
Supreme Court term with a philosophically opaque discussion of the
interdependence of law and narrative, but from the illustrations that he
drew from biblical and rabbinic texts of ancient and medieval times. For
Cover, both intellectually and as a matter of personal commitment, these
ancient texts evoke a "nomian world," rooted more in communally shared
stories of legal origins and utopian ends than in the brutalities of
institutional enforcement, one from which modem legal theory and
practice have much to learn and to emulate. Since my own head is buried
most often in such ancient texts, rather than in modem courts, I thought it
appropriate to reflect, by way of offering more such texts for our
consideration, on the long-standing preoccupation with the intersection
and interdependency of the discursive modes of law and narrative in
Hebrew biblical and rabbinic literature, without, I hope, romanticizing
them. Indeed, I wish to demonstrate that what we might think of as a
particularly modem tendency to separate law from narrative, has itself an
ancient history, and to show how that tendency, while recurrent, was as
recurrently resisted from within Jewish tradition. In particular, at those
cultural turning points in which laws are extracted or codified from
previous narrative settings, I hope to show that they are also renarrativized
(or remythologized) so as to address, both ideologically and rhetorically,
changed socio-historical settings.2  I will do so through admittedly
* Steven D. Fraade is the Mark Taper Professor of the History of Judaism, teaching in the
Religious Studies Department and the Judaic Studies Program at Yale University.
1. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword. Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
2. To the extent that such renarrativizing of biblical law is also a form of remythologizing see
MICHAEL FISHBANE, BIBLICAL MYTH AND RABBINIC MYTHMAKING (2003).
1
Fraade: Nomos and Narrative Before Nomos and Narrative
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
selective, yet telling, examples.
Let me begin not at the historical beginning, but with a well known
comment-well known at least among students of rabbinic learning-
which marks roughly a midpoint in the history of "nomos and narrative,"
even as it attends to the opening words of the Torah's account of creation.
While this comment is usually credited to the medieval rabbinic
commentator Rashi,? whom I cite, Rashi in turn credits a third-fourth
century rabbinic sage for its origins:
Said Rabbi Isaac: There was no reason to begin the Torah, but from
"This month shall be to you" (Exodus 12:2, introducing the laws of
Passover), which is the first commandment with which Israel was
[collectively] commanded. So why did he open with "In the
beginning"?4
Rashi's answer to this question is, in effect, that it was necessary first to
establish God's creator credentials as justification for having given to the
people of Israel the land of other nations.5 I am less interested in (or
sympathetic to) Rashi's answer than to his (and R. Isaac's) question, or
rather, to what the question assumes: If the Torah (Pentateuch) is primarily
and fundamentally a collection of commandments, that is, of laws, why
delay by all of the Book of Genesis and the first eleven chapters of the
Book of Exodus before getting to the legal heart of the matter? In this
view, the narrative framework of the Torah, if not of the whole Hebrew
Bible, appears to be mere padding-which could easily be dispensed
with-were it not for its value in establishing that the commander-in-chief
of Israel, in particular, is the universal creator of the whole world and its
peoples. Whatever the justificatory value of Rashi's opening comment, it
hardly does justice to the richness of the biblical narrative that follows, or,
for that matter, to the great learning, insight, and sensitivity that Rashi
himself displays in elucidating almost every detail of that biblical
narrative. Certainly, the lengthy narrative prologue to the biblical laws
must do more than simply set the stage for their revelation and reception.
Indeed, unlike Rashi, most critical scholars of the Hebrew Bible today,
especially those with literary sensitivities, would characterize it not as a
law book enclosed in a narrative wrapper, but as a grand narrative of
God's relationship with humanity and, at its center, with Israel in
3. Rashi is an acronym for Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac (1040-1105), a French commentator on the
Hebrew Bible and Talmud.
4. SOLOMON BEN ISAAC, RASHI 'AL HATrORAH I (A. Berliner ed., 1969). Rabbi Isaac is most
likely of the late third/early fourth century, mainly in Palestine, but also in Babylonia. Rabbi Isaac's
view is first cited in TANHUMA BERE'SHIT I1 (S. Buber ed., 1885), but in briefer form. For a similar
idea, see MEKHILTA OF RABBI ISHMAEL BAHODESH 5; GENESIS RABBA 1:2. Here and below, unless
otherwise noted, English translations are my own.
5. In the continuation to his commentary to Genesis 1:1 Rashi (and his source) cites Psalm 111:6:
"He revealed to his people his powerful works, in giving them the heritage of nations."
[Vol. 17:81
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particular. This relationship, or covenant, revolves around the reciprocity
of divine beneficence and human response, principally through the divine
giving of commandments and the human obligatory practice thereof.
From this perspective, in its present composite form, the laws and
narratives of the Bible are both literarily and theologically inextricable
from one another. Divine bestowal of the commandments occurs at a
critical junction in the covenantal narrative, in the wilderness interim
between liberation from slavery in a strange land and settlement in the
Promised Land. Conversely, Israel's acceptance and fulfillment of its
covenantal obligations is the primary condition for the eventual
completion of that narrative through the divine bestowal of divine
blessings in the coming "end of days."6  In other words, the divine
commandments are themselves central events in the biblical soteriological
narrative, while that narrative confers both historical and teleological
meaning upon the commandments. In Cover's terms, then, the
commandments serve as a "bridge" not just between an unredeemed
present and a redemptive future, but also between a perpetual present and
an originary, law-giving past, or, perhaps more aptly, as a shuttle line
between all three. To employ David Damrosch's phrase, the Bible in
form, content, and meaning is a "narrative covenant."7
When and how was it that what might be read by modems as a grand
sacro-historical narrative was viewed principally as a law book? It is
principally in the period following the Babylonian exile and Persian
conquest (sixth-fifth centuries B.C.E.) that the canonical Torah as a whole
is regarded as a law book in an authoritative, juridical sense. This was
partly the result of Persian imperialism.8 Here I wish to stress that a
consequential stage in, and long-lasting influence of, the process of post-
exilic "legalization" of the Torah occurs with a curious choice of inter-
lingual translation. Beginning in the mid-third century B.C.E., in
6. Deuteronomy 4:30; 31:29.
7. DAVID DAMROSCH, THE NARRATIVE COVENANT: TRANSFORMATION OF GENRE IN THE
GROWTH OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE (1987); see also CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, LAW AND NARRATIVE
IN THE BIBLE: THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEUTERONOMIC LAWS AND THE DECALOGUE (1985); VICTOR
AVIGDOR HUROWITZ, INU ANUM SIRUM: LITERARY STRUCTURES IN THE NON-JURIDICAL SECTIONS
OF CODEX HAMMURABI (1994) (discussing the role of narrative in ancient Near Eastern law);
NANETTE STAHL, LAW AND LIMINALITY IN THE BIBLE (1995); David Damrosch, Leviticus, in THE
LITERARY GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 66-77 (Robert Alter & Frank Kermode eds., 1987).
8. See SETH SCHWARTZ, IMPERIALISM AND JEWISH SOCIETY: 200 B.C.E.-640 C.E. 19-22 (2001).
However, unlike Schwartz, I would stress that external factors did not operate in isolation from
internal propellants, especially the lessons learned from the experience of exile as understood via the
teachings of the Prophets: that Israel needed to recommit itself to the fulfillment of its covenantal
obligations in order to restore its covenantal fortunes, which required the teaching of its self-defining
laws and narratives by one generation to the next. However, although the prophets repeatedly
"prosecute" Israel for its covenantal failings, they are not presented as legal experts per se, nor do they
make explicit reference to the Torah text as a legal code for practice. It is only in the post-exilic, post-
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Alexandria, Egypt, bilingual Jews translate-in what comes to be called
the Septuagint-the biblical Hebrew word torah, in a wide range of
meanings and usages, with the Greek word nomos. The noun torah,
meaning literally "directive," includes within its early range of usages
something akin to law writ small, especially in the sense of cultic, ritual,
and judicial directions and procedures, and is frequently used (often in the
plural) in conjunction with such other biblical terms for law as mitsvah,
hoq, and mishpat. However, it expands in meaning to denote within the
Hebrew Bible much more, including: divine teaching, prophetic
preaching, moral exhortation, and wise living more broadly. Eventually it
becomes synonymous with revelation or Scripture as a whole,
encompassing as it does the entire covenantal narrative of Israel's history
and obligations. Especially in its Deuteronomic, prophetic, and post-exilic
contexts, torah overlaps only partly with the range of meanings of nomos,
and might more suitably have been translated with a Greek term closer in
meaning to teaching writ large as, to conjure up another of Cover's
favorite Greek terms, paideia (cultural instruction and discipline).9
The price these ancient biblical translators paid for their consistency in
translating torah as nomos (200 times out of 220) was the unintended
consequence of characterizing the Torah (Pentateuch) and the Hebrew
Bible overall as "The Law," as the Septuagint's nomos and the Vulgate's
lex are translated, in turn, by most modem English translations of the
Bible. As long ago noted by C. H. Dodd: "Thus over a wide range the
rendering of torah by nomos is thoroughly misleading, and it is to be
regretted that the English versions followed the Septuagint (via the
Vulgate) in so many cases," thereby "giving a misleading legalistic tone to
much of the Old Testament."' ° Once the Torah and the Hebrew Bible are
represented as "The Law," then the isolation of its narratives from its laws,
and the reductionist dichotomization of Old Testament Law (and
"legalism") vs. New Testament Spirit are not far to follow. It is precisely
this terminological dis-integration of the laws and narratives of the Bible
that permitted the former to be largely abrogated while the latter to be
typologized in what came to be the dominant, supersessionist narrative of
Christianity-with grave historical consequences for the fate of Jews at
9. See THE THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 4:1022-91 (Gerhard Kittel &
Gerhard Friedrich eds., Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., 1967); see also Adele Reinhartz, The Meaning of
Nomos in Philo 's Exposition of the Law, 15 STUDIES IN RELIGION/ SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES 337 (1986);
PETER RICHARDSON, ET AL., LAW IN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE ROMAN PERIOD: THE DISPUTE
OVER "TORAH" AND "NOMOS" IN POST-BIBLICAL JUDAISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY (1991); ALAN
SEGAL, Torah and Nomos in Recent Scholarly Discussion, in THE OTHER JUDAISM OF LATE
ANTIQUITY 131 (1987); Stephen Westerholm, Torah, Nomos and Law: A Question of Meaning, 15
STUDIES IN RELIGION/SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES 194 (1986). On paideia, see THE THEOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 5:596-625 (Gerhard Kittel & Gerhard Friedrich eds., Geoffrey
W. Bromiley trans., 1967).
10. C. H. DODD, THE BIBLE AND THE GREEKS 33,41 (1935).
[Vol. 17:81
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Returning to our own story, the difficulty post-exilic Jews must have
faced in relating to the Torah's laws as Law, is precisely the manner in
which they are intermingled with and scattered throughout the Torah's
grand covenantal narrative. They are not organized according to any
overarching taxonomic logic or structure that would readily facilitate their
pedagogical acquisition or juridical application. Furthermore, whole areas
of law are presumed but only thinly represented, being, as the later
rabbinic teachers metaphorically conceded, "like mountains hanging by a
hair."" Nor, for that matter, does the Torah present, except in a very
fragmentary manner, the judicial structures and procedures necessary for
the application of its laws. Thus, we find, not long after the Torah's
canonization, a variety of attempts, partial at first, to gather the Torah's
laws from their various scriptural narrative settings, to fill in their gaps,
resolve their inconsistencies, and to group them under imposed topical
rubrics. I intend to demonstrate that each such effort at legal extraction,
supplementation, and redaction involves a degree of renarrativization, as
the extracted and regrouped laws are both interwoven with new or
reworked micro-narratives and set within a reformulated macro-narrative
spanning covenantal origins and ends.'
2
The second-century B.C.E. Book of Jubilees, presenting itself as an
esoteric, angelic revelation to Moses from heavenly tablets, repeatedly
weaves legal traditions into its retelling of the narratives of the Book of
Genesis and the beginning of the Book of Exodus, structured according to
fifty-year cycles of time. It thereby asserts that the early patriarchs knew
and observed, as if according to a predetermined cosmic plan, the Torah's
laws long before their more public revelation at Mt. Sinai. After narrating
the story of the Exodus from Egypt, Jubilees gathers laws of Passover
from a variety of biblical locations, adds some biblically unattested
Passover rules, and presents them as a coherent unit,' 3 followed by a
similar grouping and expansion of Sabbath laws'4 on the occasion of the
Israelites' arrival at the Wilderness of Sin (one stop before Mt. Sinai).' 5
11. See MISHNAH HAGIGAH 1:8; SIFRE DEUTERONOMY 335 at 385 (Louis Finkelstein ed., 1939).
12. Space does not allow a demonstration here of how this process already is evidenced inner-
biblically, most notably in the Book of Deuteronomy, or "seconded nomos," which was to have great
influence in the narrative reconstructions of biblical law in post-biblical times. See BERNARD M.
LEVINSON, DEUTERONOMY AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF LEGAL INNOVATION (1997).
13. Jubilees 49:1-23.
14. Jubilees 50:1-13.
15. Note that an earlier discussion of the significance of the Sabbath and some rules for its
observance is incorporated into the Book ofJubilees' recounting of the narrative of creation (2:17-33).
See JAMES C. VANDERKAM, THE BOOK OF JUBILEES (2001) (providing a recent introduction to this
pseudepigraphic work); see also Michael Segal, The Relationship Between the Legal and Narrative
Passages in Jubilees (Reuben and Bilhah/Judah and Tamar), in REWRITING THE BIBLE: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE ORION CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE DEAD
SEA SCROLLS AND ASSOCIATED LITERATURE (Devorah Dimant & Esther Chazon eds., 2005); Michael
2005]
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Thus, even as Jubilees extracts laws from their biblical contexts so as to
gather them topically, it also inserts laws into new narrative contexts so as
to restructure the scriptural narrative according to continuous cycles of
time and revelation. It thereby demonstrates that the knowledge and
observance of divinely revealed law-at least for the spiritual elite-
extends back to the very beginnings of sacred history and is continuous
with its rhythmic progression.
An even more extensive extraction and rearrangement of biblical laws
can be found in the work of the first-century C.E. Jewish philosopher and
biblical commentator Philo of Alexandria. After devoting a separate
treatise to an allegorical interpretation of each of the Ten Commandments,
Philo collects and orders the remaining laws of the Torah into a treatise
called The Special Laws, taking the Ten Commandments to represent ten
legal (and philosophical) rubrics under which all of the other laws could
be topically organized and allegorically explained.'6 However, Philo's
extraction and reordering of the biblical laws serves much more than
simply a need to render them more accessible or applicable. Through his
allegorizing interpretations of the laws, Philo effectively removes them
from the "horizontal" narrative of biblical history and repositions them
within an overarching "vertical" narrative of the individual soul's
perfection and ultimate ascension to reunion with its divine, heavenly
source, which similarly pervades his allegorical interpretations of the
biblical narratives and personalities.
By contrast, the first-century C.E. Jewish historian Josephus, in his
twenty-book history the Jewish Antiquities, retells the biblical history from
the creation of the world and extends it chronologically down to his own
day, largely excising the corpora of biblical laws so as to allow a more
continuous narrative, while leaving anecdotal references to Jewish
practices along the way. At several points in his narrative, however, he
promises to produce a sustained and detailed treatment of the Jewish laws,
along with their reasons, to be called "On Customs and Causes," which he
appears never to have written or completed.' 7 However, at one point in his
history Josephus makes an exception, interrupting the narrative. In Book
4 of his Jewish Antiquities, at the end of Moses' life, Josephus relates how
Moses gave the people "these laws and this constitution (politeia)
recorded in a book."' 8 But before continuing his narrative, he wishes to
present this "constitution":
Segal, The Book of Jubilees: Rewritten Bible, Redaction, Ideology and Theology (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University) (on file with author).
16. See PHILO, DE DECALAGO 154-174.
17. See JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 1.25, 192; 3.94, 143, 218, 230, 257, 205, 259; 4.198, 302; 20.268.
18. JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 4.194. Translations are from the Loeb Classical Library. On Josephus'
use of politeia for torah, see S. Dean McBride, Jr., Polity of the Covenant People: The Book of
Deuteronomy, 41 INTERPRETATION 229, 229-233 (1987).
[Vol. 17:81
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But here I am fain first to describe this constitution, consonant as it
was with the reputation of the virtue of Moses, and withal to enable
my readers thereby to learn what was the nature of our laws from the
first, and then to revert to the rest of the narrative. 9
Josephus modestly (but falsely) claims that he is simply passing on,
without added embellishment, what Moses bequeathed to the people.
However, he admits to having made one "innovation," so as to make the
Mosaic "constitution" more readily accessible to his readers: "to classify
the several subjects; for [Moses] left what he wrote in a scattered
(sporadin) condition, just as he received each several instruction from
God."2 Josephus' presentation of the Mosaic constitution includes such
matters as: proper worship, the public reading of the Torah, the proper
administration of justice, the place of the king within the theocracy, the
rights of the poor, widows, and orphans, marriage and family laws, burial
of criminals, usury, loans and pledges, theft, slavery and emancipation,
restitution of lost property, laws of injury and damages, deposits, sexual
aberrance, wages, and the proper conduct of war. However, beyond the
details of the legal interpretations implicit in Josephus' reformulation and
elaboration of biblical laws, it is most striking that Josephus needs to
apologize in advance for breaking the narrative flow of his history, and for
topically rearranging the laws so as to form a coherent "constitution," in
contrast to the "scattered" manner in which they appear in the divinely
revealed Torah. Josephus' reconstituting of biblical laws into a
"constitution," however, fits well within a recurring apologetic theme of
Josephus' overall narrative history: the superiority of the Mosaic
theocratic constitution to other forms of government current in the Greco-
Roman world of his time, and the attribution of Israel's national woes to
that constitution having been compromised, especially by the institution of
monarchy.2
19. JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 4.196.
20. JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 4.197. See similar statements by Josephus in JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 1.17;
2.234; 4.196-98; 10.218; 20.261; and compare them to JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 9.242; 12.109; 14.2-3 and
AGAINST APION 1.42. Josephus appears to be cognizant of the Deuteronomic injunction (4:2; 12:32),
neither to add to nor subtract from God's word. But if he takes Deuteronomy as his model, he is in
good company in his additions and subtractions, as well as his regroupings, of the Torah he wishes to
convey. Also see Philo's admiration for this Deuteronomic principle in ON THE SPECIAL LAWS 4.143;
and compare it to LETTER OF ARISTEAS 311. It remains to be asked why Josephus includes his major
rewriting of Jewish law here, at the point of Moses' death, rather than earlier at the point of the
revelation at Mt. Sinai. Cf JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 3.94. Perhaps this arises from Josephus'
identification of his own reworking of biblical law and narrative in his later years with Moses' in the
Book of Deuteronomy, narratively framed by the end of Moses' life. For discussion of this topic, see
Louis FELDMAN, FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS: TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, JUDEAN ANTIQUITIES 1-4,
7-8 (Steve Mason ed., 2000)
21. See AGAINST APION 2.164-165, 184-188; JEWISH ANTIQUITIES 4.223; 6.35-44; 11.111; 14.41,
91; 20.229, 251; JEWISH WAR 1.169-170. Cf HERODOTUS 3.80-83. For Josephus' retelling of biblical
narratives so as to introduce or emphasize the priests' governing role, see HAROLD W. ATTRIDGE, THE
INTERPRETATION OF BIBLICAL HISTORY IN THE ANTIQUITATES JUDAICAE OF FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS 176-
20051
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The most extensive corpus of reworked and reintegrated biblical law
and narrative from the second temple period is now to be found in the
veritable time capsule of the Dead Sea Scrolls, much of which, especially
its legal texts, were not yet published at the time of Cover's Nomos and
Narrative. Indeed, the yahad (Cover's "strong community") of the
Qumran scrolls could have provided him with another "case study" of
"bringing the messiah through the law," or of "legal apocalypticism," that
is, a commitment to law as a "jurisgenerative" bridge between the
unredeemed present and the eagerly anticipated messianic future that is so
strong as to envision the "suffer[ing] and/or inflict[ing] of violence for its
'law.' ' 22  Several central texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls display the
extraction of biblical laws from their biblical narrative settings, their
exegetical amplification, regrouping according to topical rubrics, and
rhetorical reconstitution within the new settings of the Qumran
community's own self-defining narrative of exilic remnant origins,
esoteric revelation, and eschatalogical restoration.
This process of legal renarrativization can be seen especially in the
Damascus Document, the Community Rule, the Messianic Rule, the
Temple Scroll, the War Scroll, and 4QMMT ("Some Torah Precepts").23
For example, the Damascus Document contains a substantial core of laws,
organized as serakhim, or topically grouped collections of rules, including
both biblical laws and sectarian rules for communal organization and
judicial and penal procedures. One of the longest of these serakhim
contains twenty-six rules concerning prohibited activities on the Sabbath,
gathered from throughout the Torah and organized under the heading,
"Concerning the Sabbath to observe it according to its law. 24 Other legal
headings in the Damascus Document include: "This is the rule for the
77(1976).
22. See Robert M. Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through Law: A Case Study, in RELIGION,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 201, 203-204 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
23. I have written several studies on these texts from this perspective, such as: Steven D. Fraade,
Interpretive Authority in the Studying Community at Qumran, 44 J. JEWISH STUD. 46 (1993); Steven
D. Fraade, Looking for Legal Midrash at Qumran, in BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVES: EARLY USE AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE IN LIGHT OF THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS, 59 (Michael E. Stone & Esther
G. Chazon eds., 1998); Steven D. Fraade, Lookingfor Narrative Midrash at Qumran, in RABBINICAL
PERSPECTIVES: RABBINIC LITERATURE AND THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS (Steven D. Fraade & Aharon
Shemesh eds., forthcoming 2006); Steven D. Fraade, Mabbat hadash 'al hammidrash hahashva'ati:
megillot yam hammelekh umidreshei haza "I (Comparative Midrash ' Revisited." The Case of the Dead
Sea Scrolls and Rabbinic Midrash), in MINCHAT YONAH: FESTSCHRIFT FOR PROF. YONAH FRAENKEL
(Yaakov Elbaum, et al. eds., 2005); Steven D. Fraade, Rhetoric and Hermeneutics, in Miqtsat Ma'ase
Ha-Torah (4QMMT): The Case of the Blessings and Curses, 10 DEAD SEA DISCOVERIES 150-61
(2003) [hereinafter Fraade, Rhetoric]; Steven D. Fraade, Shifting from Priestly to Non-Priestly Legal
Authority: A Comparison of the Damascus Document and the Midrash Sifra, 6 DEAD SEA
DISCOVERIES 109 (1999); Steven D. Fraade, The'Torah of the King' (Deut 17:14-20) in the Temple
Scroll and Early Rabbinic Law, in THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS AS BACKGROUND TO POSTBIBLICAL
JUDAISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY 25 (James R. Davila ed., 2003); Steven D. Fraade, To Whom It
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Judges of the Congregation;" "This is the rule for the Guardian of the
camp;" and "This is the rule for the Congregation by which it shall
provide for all its needs." With a few exceptions, these rules are stated
without explicit recourse to biblical citation and explication. All of these
topically grouped rules are set within a larger hortatory frame which
begins with a narrative history encompassing the community's origins and
eschatalogical expectations.2 5 Along the way, several elements of a retold
narrative of biblical history are integrated into the hortatory admonitions,
thereby reinforcing the community's self-understanding as being the
chosen successors to the "covenant of the first ones," who had gone
astray.26 The text, we now know from fragments found at Qumran,
concludes with reference to an annual covenantal ceremony, in which
blessings and curses were invoked upon those who obeyed and disobeyed,
respectively, the community's laws, and in which the community
collectively accepted and rededicated itself to the foregoing rules and
principles of communal discipline, "in accordance with the final
interpretation of the Torah. '27 Thus, the combination of the hortatory
admonitions, with their implanting of sectarian historical origins within a
retold biblical narrative, and the extracted and regrouped laws is mutually
reinforcing: the laws which are observed and adjudicated by the sectarian
community confirm the community's elite status within the broader retold
narrative of the history of Israel, which in turn confers teleological
significance upon those laws.
Up until now, the post-biblical texts of legal extraction and
renarrativization have displayed little self-awareness of this interrelation
of law and narrative. It is only in rabbinic texts, first taking shape about a
century after the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 C.E., that we
find in Judaism the first terminological designation of and differentiation
between law and narrative, as halakhah and aggadah respectively, and
with it, the first self-conscious reflection on their interconnection. The
nominalization of the verbs halakh (to walk, or conduct oneself) and
higgid (to narrate) as halakhah (law) and haggadah/aggadah (narrative),
signals their reification as separable phenomena, thereby facilitating a
discourse concerning their interrelation. Thus, we find in our earliest
rabbinic texts the delineation of a pedagogic curriculum that differentiates
between written Scripture (miqra ) with oral teaching (mishnah), the latter
comprising midrash (scriptural interpretation), halakhah (law), and
25. CD 1-8.
26. CD :4;3:1O;4:9;6:2;cf 8:17; 19:29.
27. See 4Q266 frg. 11; 4Q269 frg. 16; 4Q270 frg. 7; Fraade, Rhetoric, supra note 23; see also
Paul Mandel, Siyyem bemah sheppatah: 'al siyyum shel megillat berit dammesek umashma'o
hassifruti [Inclusio: On the Final Section of the Damascus Document and Its Literary Significance], 2
MEGHILLOT: STUDIES IN THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS 57 (2004).
2005]
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aggadah (narrative).28
To give an example with semantic connections to the name Cover (from
haver, "friend, colleague"), in commenting on Pirqe 'Avot (1:6), 'aseh
lekha rav uqeneh lekha haver ("Provide yourself with a teacher, and get
yourself a colleague"), the Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan attends to
the singular form of the word "teacher" as follows:
Provide yourself with a teacher: how so? This teaches that one
should provide himself with a single teacher and study with him
Scripture and Mishnah - Midrash, Halakha, and Agada. Then the
interpretation which the teacher neglected to tell him in the study of
Scripture he will eventually tell him in the study of Mishnah; the
interpretation which he neglected to tell him in the study of Mishnah
he will eventually tell him in the study of Midrash; the interpretation
which he neglectedto tell him in the study of Midrash he will
eventually tell him in the study of Halakha; the interpretation which
he neglected to tell him in the study of Halakhah he will eventually
tell him in the study of Agada. Thus the man remains in one place
and is filled with good and blessing.29
Thus, while exegesis, law, and narrative are differentiable as modes of
study, they are not to be isolated from one another by assignment to
specialized teachers, but rather integrated in the paideic performance of
the single master teacher in sustained relation to his student.30
Similarly, the Sifre commentary to the Book of Deuteronomy interprets
the opening of Moses' final oration to the Israelites prior to his death and
28. Louis Finkelstein, Midrash, halakhot vehaggadot, in YITZHAK F. BAER JUBILEE VOLUME ON
THE OCCASION OF His SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 28 (S. W. Baron et al. eds., 1960), reprinted in LOUIS
FINKELSTEIN, 5 SIFRA ON LEVITICUS 100-19 (1991); Judah Goldin, The Freedom and Restraint of
Haggadah, in MIDRASH AND LITERATURE 57 (Geoffrey H. Hartman & Sanford Budick eds., 1986);
MENAHEM KISTER, 'IYYUNIM BE'AVOT DERABBI NATAN: NUSAH 'ARIKHAH UPARSHANUT [STUDIES IN
AVOT DE-RABBI NATHAN: TEXT, REDACTION, AND INTERPRETATION] 42 (1998). It should be noted
that the following examples are drawn from rabbinic texts of varied provenance, both chronological
and geographical, and therefore my discussion, due to limits of space, will of necessity be only
schematic, failing to draw distinctions across time and place.
29. The text continues:
R. Me'ir used to say: He that studies Torah with a single teacher, to whom may he be likened?
To one who had a single field, part of which he sowed with wheat and part with barley, and
planted part with olives and part with oak trees. Now that man is full of good and blessing. But
when one studies with two or three teachers he is like him who has many fields: one he sows
with wheat and one he sows with barley, and plants one with olives and one with oak trees.
Now this man's (attention) is divided among many pieces of land, without good or blessing.
THE FATHERS ACCORDING TO RABBI NATHAN 8, at 49-50 (Judah Goldin trans., 1955).
30. Contrast the metaphorical description of R. Akiba, generally thought to have given an earlier
version of the Mishnah its topical structure:
Rabbi Eleazar ben Shammua' says: There are three types of scholars: the hewn stone, the
cornerstone, the polished stone. . . . The polished stone: for example, the disciple who has
studied Midrash, Halakhah, Agada, and Tosephta: when a scholar comes to him and asks about
Midrash, he answers him; about Halakha, he answers him; about Tosephta, he answers him;
about Agada, he answers him. And that is a polished stone, for it has all its four sides exposed.
THE FATHERS ACCORDING TO RABBI NATHAN 28, at 117-18 (Judah Goldin trans., 1955).
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their entry into the land of Canaan:
"May my discourse come down as rain" (Deuteronomy 32:2): Just as
rain falls on trees and infuses each type with its distinctive flavor -
the grapevine with its flavor, the olive tree with its flavor, the fig tree
with its flavor - so too words of Torah are all one, but they
comprise miqra' (Scripture) and mishnah (oral teaching): midrash
(interpretation), 3' halakhot (laws), and haggadot (narratives) ....
Another interpretation: Just as rain cannot be anticipated until it
arrives, as it says, "And after a while the sky grew black with clouds
[and there was wind and a heavy downpour]" (1 Kings 18:45),32 so
too you cannot know what a disciple of the sages is until he teaches:
mishnah (oral teaching), halakhot (laws), and haggadot (narratives);
33
or until he is appointed administrator (parnas) over the public.
34
According to this comment, the interpretations, laws, and narratives of
Torah teaching "are all one, 35 not only because, like the rain, they derive
from a single heavenly, divine source, but equally, through a subtle
exegetical slippage, because they are taught by, and hence integrated
within, a single earthly, human sage. Thus, the diversity of rabbinic
pedagogic discourse, legal as well as narrative, has a single origin and is
integrated within the ideal teacher/sage who masters them all and imparts
them to his students.
Such repeated emphasis on the integration of legal and narrative
teaching, we must assume, masks its opposite: that there was (as there
continues to be) a scholarly tendency to specialization, to a division of
labor and turf, with a consequent dis-integration of legal and narrative
modes of scholarly discourse, which the above texts seek to thwart. In
short, rabbinic literature strongly resists, but thereby acknowledges, the
intellectual tendency toward, in Peter Brooks's terms, legal autonomy and
hermeticism.36
Indeed, we know that among early rabbinic sages there was some
degree of competition between teachers of law and of narrative, with each
group of specialists claiming for itself superior knowledge and
importance. For example, legal teachers might think that their legal
expertise was sufficient and that the study of narratives was superfluous:
"If, then, you carefully keep all this commandment" (Deuteronomy
31. This is the reading in the London and Oxford manuscripts, as well as the reading in YALQUT
SHIM'ONI. The Berlin manuscript has talmud, while the Editio Princeps (1546) and MIDRASH
HAKHAMIM have neither.
32. The prophet Elijah sent his servant seven times to look for signs of rain until on the seventh
try he spotted a small cloud in the distance. The rain storm then came suddenly.
33. This is the reading in the London and Oxford manuscripts, the Editio Princeps, and YALQUT
SHIM'ONI. MIDRASH HAKHAMIM has midrash, haggadot, and halakhot.
34. SIFRE DEUTERONOMY 306, at 339 (Louis Finkelstein ed., 1939).
35. Id.
36. See Peter Brooks, Narrativity of the Law, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 1, 2, 9 (2002).
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11:22)... For you should not say, it is enough for me that I have
studied laws (halakhot). Scripture teaches, "commandment," "the
commandment," "all this commandment"37: study midrash, halakhot,
and haggadot.38
Even though legal scholars may have thought their subject to be more
weighty, they also realized that narratives had greater popular appeal, as
reflected in the following talmudic story:
R. Abbahu and R. Hiyya b. Abba once came to a certain place. R.
Abbahu expounded 'aggadah and R. Hiyya b. Abba expounded law
(shem 'ata ). All the people left R. Hiyya b. Abba and went to hear R.
Abbahu, so that the former was depressed. [R. Abbahu] said to him:
"I will give you a parable. To what can this be compared? To two
men, one of whom was selling precious stones and the other various
kinds of small ware. To whom will the people hurry? Is it not to the
seller of various kinds of small ware?"
' 39
Yet notwithstanding, or perhaps to counter, the centrifugal force of this
competition, rabbinic texts stress the interdependence of Torah laws and
narratives, as in the following early midrash:
"[He suckled him] with the kidney fat of wheat" (Deuteronomy
32:14): This refers to the laws (halakhot), which are the body of the
Torah. "And the blood of grapes you drank for wine" (ibid.): This
refers to the narratives (haggadot), which draw the heart of a person
like wine.4°
The wheat (i.e., bread) and wine that God fed to Israel are here understood
as metaphors for the laws and narratives of the Torah, which, as it were,
Israel continues to ingest for its physical and spiritual sustenance. The
laws may be more substantive, but it is the narratives that have the greater
emotional draw, and are, therefore, necessary to sustain the laws. Indeed,
37. The expression kol hammitsvah is understood to contain three levels or layers of meaning,
corresponding to the three stages in which the expression is built up: the indefinite noun mitzvah alone,
the same noun with the addition of the definite article, and the definite noun with the addition of the
inclusive particle kol.
38. SIFRE DEUTERONOMY 48, at 113 (Finkelstein ed., 1939), with more of the same in the
continuation. For teachers of narratives, see StFRE DEUTERONOMY 49, at 115: "The expounders of
haggadot say: If you desire to come to know the one who spoke and the world came into being, study
haggadah, for thereby you will come to know the one who spoke and the world came into being and
cling to His ways." The Vatican, London, and Berlin manuscripts, as well as YALQUT SHIM'ONI
(Salonika) have doreshe haggadot (or 'aggadot). However, the Editio Princeps, MIDRASH
HAGGADOL, AND YALQUT SHIM'ONI (Oxford mansucript) have instead, doreshe reshumot
("expounders of traces"). Strictly on text-critical grounds, the former is the superior reading, even if
the latter is the more difficult. On the latter, see Daniel Boyarin, On the Identification of the Dorshei
Reshumot: A Lexicographical Study, 3 BEER-SHEVA 23 (1988). For the deprecation of narrative
tradition and study by rabbinic legal scholars in late antique and medieval times, see Goldin, supra
note 28, at 59-63.
39. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sotah 40a. For a similar story of competition between preferences
for halakhah and aggadah, see BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Qamma 60b.
40. SIFRE DEUTERONOMY 317, at 359 (Finkelstein ed., 1939).
(Vol. 17:81
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol17/iss1/5
Fraade
midrashic commentary often serves up a medley of the two, reading law
into biblical narrative and narrative into biblical law in order for the one to
reinforce the other.
The pattern that we saw in second temple Jewish literature-of
reconstituting biblical laws by extracting them from their biblical narrative
contexts so as to topically gather and rearrange them-is carried very
much further in the Mishnah (commonly attributed to R. Judah the
Patriarch of the early third century), than in any of its antecedents. There,
biblical and post-biblical laws are combined and organized according to
topical, non-biblical rubrics: six orders, divided into sixty-three tractates,
subdivided into 523 chapters, into which individual mishnaic rulings are
arranged. But to conceive of this simply as an ideologically innocent
editorial reordering would be a gross simplification, since the Mishnah
fundamentally transforms received laws according to its own mishnaic
language, oral syntax, and dialogical rhetoric.4'
Although mishnaic law is generally presented independently of any
biblical or rabbinic continuous narrative context, the Mishnah
renarrativizes Torah law, written and oral, in at least four significant, but
largely unacknowledged, ways. First, the Mishnah provides, at the
beginning of tractate Avot, what might be regarded as its master narrative,
in which a "chain of tradition" is traced from Sinai through exile and
return to the early generations of rabbinic sages, the most recent links
whereby Torah, written and oral, is received and transmitted, but also
augmented. Thus, to the extent that the Mishnah extends the biblical
narrative into its own historical present, it does so not as a succession of
events, institutions, or personalities, but in terms of the transmission of
revealed and received Torah teaching, through the successive generations
of sages and their disciples. It is thereby making a powerful claim for its
own legal authority.42
41. As we saw with Josephus, the claim to be only rearranging, may itself be a conceit of false
modesty. For discussion of Josephus, see supra note 20. Compare this to the metaphorical description
of R. Akiba, generally thought to have given an earlier version of the Mishnah its topical structure:
To what might R. Akiba be likened? To a laborer who took his basket and went forth. When he
found wheat, he put some in the basket; when he found barley, he put that in; spelt, he put that
in; lentils, he put them in. Upon retuming home he sorted out the wheat by itself, the barley by
itself, the beans by themselves, the lentils by themselves. This is how Rabbi Akiba acted, and
he arranged the whole Torah in rings.
THE FATHERS ACCORDING TO RABBI NATHAN, supra note 29, 18, at 90.
42. Note, in this regard, the extensions of biblical history down to the time of the author in
Josephus' JEWISH ANTIQUITIES, Ben Sira's "Praise of the Ancestors" (44:1-50:24), the "Animal
Apocalypse" (1 Enoch 85-90), and the opening of the DAMASCUS DOCUMENT (CD 1:1-2:1). Even if,
as many scholars hold, Mishnah Avot, in its present form, is later than the other tractates of the
Mishnah, its ideological function as part of the Mishnah as a whole remains the same. On the "chain
of tradition" of Mishnah Avot, see most recently AMRAM D. TROPPER, WISDOM, POLITICS, AND
HISTORIOGRAPHY: TRACTATE AVOT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GRAECO-ROMAN NEAR EAST (2004);
Amram D. Tropper, The Fate of Jewish Historiography after the Bible: A New Interpretation, 43 HIS.
& THEORY 179 (2004).
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Second, the Mishnah, while not framing its rules in a continuous
narrative, includes many narrative anecdotes (ma'asim) to exemplify, but
also to problematize, its rules. These stories are peopled mainly not by
biblical characters, but by late second temple and early rabbinic figures
and their contemporaries. Thus, to the extent that the Mishnah extracts
biblical laws from biblical narrative time, it renarrativizes them in
contemporaneous rabbinic time, thereby providing an implicit
transmissional and authority-bearing bridge between the two, otherwise
separate chronological contexts.
Third, Mishnaic rules are commonly formulated in dialogical rhetoric,
whether between named or anonymous rabbinic opinions within the text,
or whether, through rhetorical question and answer, between the text and
its implied audience of rabbinic teachers and students. It thereby creates
by its own dialogical rhetoric a dynamic of legal and narrative transaction,
into which it draws its auditors in complicitous engagement as textual
practitioners and players.
Fourth, the Mishnah commonly presents cultic, ritual, judicial, and
penal procedures in dramatically narrativized form, being described more
than prescribed. Though these legal practices are often performatively
inoperable in the historical context of mishnaic times, through their
narrativization they become perpetually present and accessible via the
portals of mishnaic study.
43
By these means (and others) the Mishnah constructs a nomian world of
"words of Torah" which is both legal and narrative in mutually
authorizing ways. Through its dialogically engaging textual practices, the
Mishnah draws its auditors in to inhabit a nomo-narrative world which is
continually under construction. Such "narrativity of law," as Peter Brooks
terms it, or, to modify Cover, "nomos as narrative," has only recently
received its analytical due with respect to the Mishnah." While at first
blush we might consider the Mishnah's "codification" as representing the
segregation of law from narrative, or halakhah from aggadah, a more
fluid understanding of these terms would allow us to recognize in the
Mishnah their dynamic re-integration, with significant paideic
reverberations. Space does not permit a consideration of the ways in
which the two talmuds, but especially the Babylonian, as well as the later
midrashic compilations, further expand and deepen this renarrativizing of
43. For example, this aspect is prominent in such Mishnaic tractates as Tamid, Ta'anit,
Sanhedrin-Makkot, but many others as well.
44. See Brooks, supra note 36. For recent studies of mishnaic law that have been attentive to its
narrativity, see BETH A. BERKOWITZ, EXECUTION AND INVENTION: DEATH PENALTY DISCOURSE IN
EARLY RABBINIC AND CHRISTIAN CULTURES (forthcoming 2005); Chaya T. Halberstam, Rabbinic
Responsibility for Evil: Evidence and Uncertainty (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University) (on file with author); Moshe Simon-Shoshan, Halachah Lema'aseh: Narrative and Legal
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halakhah, and vice versa.45
This telegraphic history of "nomos and narrative" in biblical and post-
biblical antiquity could and should be continued through late antique,
medieval, and modem times. Then we would see even more clearly that
the dynamic process whereby law is extracted from one narrative setting
only to be renarrativized in another is inextricably bound to the ongoing
process of legal reception, interpretation, and transmission. Stated
differently, while each stage of legal codification produces the next stage
of legal commentary, it also necessitates the reframing of received laws in
new (or renewed) narratives of historical, ideological, and teleological
signification.
At the outset of his essay, Cover stated:
In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related.
Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in
discourse-to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and
end, explanation and purpose. And every narrative is insistent in its
demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.46
I hope to have demonstrated that this interrelation is as old as the Torah
and as persistent as its millennia of interpretation. But I hope also to have
shown that to the extent that law and narrative are "inseparably related,"
their interrelation is best viewed in the recurring attempts to extract law
from narrative, which in turn has enabled its renarrativization. Stated
differently, this dynamic interrelation is one in which law does not simply
"demand" its supporting narrative of "history and destiny," but becomes
itself a narrative of possible worlds of ends and means; not simply nomos
and narrative, but nomos as narrative. This ongoing dialectical process of
law and narrative becoming, as it were, one another, is captured in the
words of the great modem Hebrew poet Hayim Nahman Bialik, who wrote
in 1916, in an essay titled Halakhah ve-Aggadah: "A living and healthy
halachah is an aggadah that has been or that will be. And the reverse is
true also. The two are one in their beginning and end."'47 I do not mean to
45. On the interrelation of talmudic law and narrative, see JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN, TALMUDIC
STORIES: NARRATIVE ART, COMPOSITION, AND CULTURE (1999); Barry Wimpheimer, "But It Is Not
So ": Toward a Poetics of Legal Narrative in the Talmud, 24 PROOFTEXTS 51 (2004).
46. Cover, supra note 1, at 5.
47. Bialik's essay was originally published in Hebrew in a journal called Knesset in 1917. It was
translated into English by Sir Leon Simon and published in London in 1944 (by the Education
Department of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland). Simon's translation has been
reissued in HAIM NAHMAN BIALIK, REVEALMENT AND CONCEALMENT: FIVE ESSAYS 47 (2000). A
similarly mystical conception of the interconnection of halakhah and aggadah runs through the
writings of another major modem Jewish/Zionist thinker, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935).
See, e.g., Abraham Isaac Kook, 'Thud hahalakhah veha "aggadak [The Unification of Halakha and
Aggadah], in 1 OROT HAKODESH, 25-27 (David Cohen ed., 1963); English translation in THE LIGHTS
OF PENITENCE, THE MORAL PRINCIPLES, LIGHTS OF HOLINESS, ESSAYS, LETTERS, AND POEMS 196
(Ben Zion Bokser trans., 1978); ABRAHAM ISAAC KOOK 'IGGROT HARAYAH 1: 123 (letter 103) (1961).
For a fuller treatment, see Avinoam Rosenak, Haphilosopiyah shel hahalakhah bemishnato shel harav
'avraham yitzhak hakkohen kuk [Philosophy of Halakha in the Works of Rabbi A. I. H. Kook] 87-145,
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suggest (nor did Bialik mean) that legal and narrative discourses are one
and the same, or that the differences in their features and functions can be
effaced, but rather, that in the complex vitality of their recurring
intersection, they are engaged together in the building and inhabiting of
shared worlds, both real and fictive, both present and anticipated.
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